This paper offers a vantage point through which to assess the phenomenon of projects codifying private law that are undertaken by private persons or institutions, distinct from legislatures and state-sponsored codification and law-revision projects. The private institution on which this paper focuses is the American Law Institute (ALI). ALI works in statutory form-most notably the Uniform Commercial Code and the Model Penal Code-as well as through projects that generate "Principles" to guide legal development within their specific fields and "Restatements" that authoritatively cover the law in a field.
It is incontestable that the ALI's work-and in particular the project of restating privatelaw subjects like agency-is not static. That is, change external to the ALI itself and the texts it promulgates tends to prompt other changes, including shifts in the functions that a Restatement serves, the structure of Restatements as texts, and the succession of one Restatement by another, as well as the nature of the work that the ALI undertakes. For reasons I discuss later, more of the ALI's work following the first generation of Restatements consisted of statutory projects. To be sure, the ALI's relatively long life among contemporary sponsors of non-state codifications highlights the phenomenon of change with more immediacy than is so for younger institutions 1 Although the ALI is not an instrumentality of the United States or of any state, its federal tax-exempt status means its property and net income are not subject to taxation, and its public-regarding purposes make it eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions from donors. 2 On the early history, see the numerous sources cited in, e.g., and the texts they sponsor. Nonetheless, responses to change warrant thought in connection with other non-state projects that promulgate texts intended to be authoritative or influential. The goals and purposes for which the ALI was founded imply that its work may be dynamic over time. Its ALI's Certificate of Incorporation states that
The particular business and objects of the society are educational, and are to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific work. 4 These organizational purposes, as applied to an ongoing organization that endures over time, may require new texts that supplant old ones.
5
The ALI's history also invites reflection on the nature of its influence and the status of its authority in the development of law in the United States, plus shifts in these over time. I suspect that one's prototype of the law and of legal change shapes how these questions might be framed and answered. Some prototypes may be a better descriptive fit for some jurisdictions than others.
Two opposing prototypes come to mind. First, an author or sponsor of a legal text intended to be authoritative could be characterized as an architect making design choices that are articulated through rules that, stated ex ante, are determinative of subsequent outcomes to which the rules apply. The end result, like a structurally-sound building constructed on the basis of an architect's plans, is static. Change within this prototype requires either outflanking the rule system or amending it. Although an author or sponsor of legal change within this prototype might be a state 4 American Law Institute. 1923. Certificate of Incorporation. www.ali.org/doc/charter.pdf. Accessed 27 Feb 2013. 5 For recognition that "it was natural for the restatements to get out of date," see Jansen, Nils and Ralf Michaels. 2007 19 Id. at 2-3. 20 Id. at 3. 21 Id. at 2. 22 Id.
-10-The ALI's concern that its authorial persona be manifested in a recognizable voice is consistent with Nils Jansen's emphasis on the form in which Restatements are written as crucial to their authority, distinct from the persuasiveness of their content. 23 Early on, the ALI's founders disdained treatise-or textbook-like discursive treatments of the law that mixed statements of present law with history and legal theory. Instead, the Restatements were to consist of "normative 'statement[s] of the principles of the law'" drafted "'with the care and precision of a well-drawn statute', and with 'the mental attitude ... of those who desire to express the law in statutory form.'" 24 Single and decisive rules of law should be articulated even in the face of uncertainty about the present state of the law. 25 And assuring that such articulations occur in a consistent voice is integral to their form.
To be sure, it is important not to overstate form's significance. As discussed below, some jurisdictions never followed or adopted the law on some issues as articulated in the In contrast, consider an episode at the 1927 Annual Meeting when discussion turned to a provision in the first Restatement of Agency that preserved the common-law rule that a woman's marriage, by destroying her capacity to consent, also eliminated her ability to be bound by transactions entered into by an agent on her behalf, even an agent appointed before the marriage.
Many states by that time had by statute abolished the common-law rule. An ALI member rose from the floor, characterized the common-law rule as "barbarous," and urged the Reporter to omit it from the draft unless he could determine that some states still followed it. This recommendation was not adopted. As it happens, in many business activities to which agency law is especially relevant-in particular those activities reliant on non-employee intermediaries such as brokers in shipping, reinsurance, and investment securities-the contemporary common law appears to share more similarities across common-law jurisdictions than in other private-law subjects. And the underlying business activity often takes place in multiple jurisdictions. 
Functions
The ALI's Handbook acknowledges that, from the beginning, "two impulses at the heart of the Restatement process" underlie a central tension: "the impulse to recapitulate the law as it presently exists and the impulse to reformulate it, thereby rendering it clearer and more coherent while subtly transforming it in the process."
41 It is also possible, as Joseph King recently wrote, that in retrospect the founders' vision for the functions to be served by Restatements may appear more "crystallized or manifest" than the reality during the ALI's early work. 42 After all, the Restatement enterprise was novel, and how the founders' initial intentions are now understood is difficult to detach from an assessment of the end-products. Moreover, these end-product 45 Id. at 31, quoting Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of the Restatement of Agency Tentative Draft No. 7, 10 A.L.I. Proc. 318 (1931 Proc. 318 ( -1932 . Restatement. The Agency Restatements thus became central to how lawyers and judges understood the subject and to the conceptual structure for teaching agency-law topics in law school curricula. In this respect, the Agency Restatements serve a function comparable to the celebrated English-law treatise, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, now in its nineteenth edition, 51 because, like Bowstead and Reynolds, the Agency Restatements occupy uncontested intellectual terrain as comprehensive accounts of the subject.
In contrast, the first Restatement of Contracts (1932) Judge Friendly, a member of the ALI's Council from 1961 until his death in 1986, was an influential participant in several ALI projects. Id. at 132. These involved the jurisdiction of federal and state courts, administrative law, corporate governance, conflicts of laws, codification of the federal securities laws, international jurisdiction, and a pre-arraignment code for prisoners. Id. Only one of theseconflict of laws-was a Restatement project. Overall Friendly's legal world was not the simpler common-law era reflected in the first generation of Restatements. His pre-judicial career involved complex business transactions and service as the general counsel of Pan American Airways. Although he wrote influential opinions applying common-law doctrines, his biographer emphasizes Friendly's distinctive contributions to business law in judicial opinions and, in extrajudicial writings, to public-law questions and court reform. Id. at 346. Section 402A signal an end to evolution in the law. Over time, many courts confined the strict liability principle to instances of manufacturing defect, as opposed to claims of defective design or inadequate warning. The ALI followed suit; Section 402A was succeeded by a separate component of the third Torts Restatement focused solely on Products Liability that confines strict liability to manufacturing defects. 69 Authority, Legitimacy, and Influence
The history of the Restatements sketched in this essay fits within the prototype of Searching for Utopia with which the paper began. Like the reins held by the rider astride the giant tortoise, the Restatements do not control their subsequent reception by courts. At times, as discussed above, Restatements may succeed in anticipating legal development; whether this constitutes guidance-as when the tortoise responds to a rein-or simply percipience-as when the rider casts his rein in the direction he predicts the tortoise will take-may depend on the observer's methodology and perspective. The ALI, as the Restatements' institutional author, constructed its voice and other elements of its authorial persona, such as the elaborate deliberative and iterative procedures that precede the final promulgation of a text as a Restatement, to enhance their usefulness, credibility, and persuasiveness.
The paper also demonstrates that some ambiguity accompanies the underlying terminology of authority and, for that matter, private law. To Nils Jansen, to say that a legal text is authoritative means that "the legal profession accept [s] that within the law of agency, "authority" itself is a term that connotes the right or power of legally-consequential representation of another person. Perhaps confusion with this meaning of "authority" underlies claims that Restatements stem from an unrepresentative institution, one not chosen through politically-accountable processes or even the legal profession as a whole. But this critique confines the meaning of "authority" to its agency sense, as opposed to credibility and reception by an intended audience.
To some legal practitioners and scholars in the United States, the term "private law"
would not be common usage. Once again one's prototype may be significant, and for some that 70 Jansen, supra note 23, at 43. 
